Analysis: A Deep Look Inside Puntland’s Offensive Against The Islamic State.
Puntland, an autonomous region in northern Somalia which struggled through a decade-long presence of the Islamic State, starts an offensive to uproot the militant group.
Background on IS-Somalia
The Islamic State Somalian Province was founded by preacher Abdul Qader Mumin on October 22, 2015, after he defected from Harakat Shabaab al Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab) and pledged allegiance to then-Caliph Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi.
Mumin had spent 5 years with Al-Shabaab, holding important positions from 2010 to 2015. In 2012, Al-Shabaab's leadership sent him to Puntland—a semi-autonomous region in northern Somalia and Mumin's homeland—to expand the group's influence and establish a more reliable communication line with Yemen.
After his official defection from Al-Shabaab in Puntland, Mumin initially struggled to gain support. Clashes with rivals forced him into exile in the Golis mountains, where he established a base with only 18 loyal fighters.
In 2016, Mumin's force had grown to 60 fighters—the entirety of IS's presence in Puntland. They captured the strategic town of Qandala and held it for two months before being driven out by Puntland regional forces, backed by U.S. advisors and NATO warships.
Why is IS-Somalia significant?
Firstly, it’s important to understand the structure of the Islamic State regional financial system, in which each region has a bigger “province” supporting one or more smaller provinces financially.
After the 2019 fall of the Caliphate in Syria and Iraq, the organization has undergone a significant shift in its relations with other provinces. Provinces were from there on expected to generate their own finances to sustain themselves and supply the surplus to other provinces in need.
This shift magnified the General Directorate of Provinces (GDP) institution's role within the Islamic State, raising it to a similar or higher position than the Caliph. This role of Director of the GDP is believed to be currently headed by Abdul Qader Mumin, who is also simultaneously the head of the Al-Karrar regional office, financially overseeing Somalia, Central Africa (DRC, Uganda), and Mozambique provinces.
However, the financial situation for IS-Somal improved so drastically that Al-Karrar could sustain itself, ISCAP, ISMP and additionally send money to affiliates in Yemen, Turkiye, and more notably Afghanistan, which we will get into why this is important.
Al-Karrar office is known to generate millions of dollars every year from different sources of revenue, such as taxing the local businesses and laundering money from Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, and other south and eastern African countries.
The surplus of this money is sent to IS affiliates outside Africa and more notably to IS Khorasan Province (ISKP), which is responsible for much of IS external operations. For example, the Crocus Hall attack, which claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians. At least a million dollars is believed to have been sent from Somalia to Afghanistan in 2023, the year leading to the March 2024 Crocus Hall attack.
Another reason why IS-Somalia is significant is because it is a hotbed for highly educated and trained foreign fighters coming from dozens of countries, mostly from Ethiopia and Tanzania. Thanks to the hundreds of foreign fighters pouring in, IS-Somal has successfully established several training camps in the Bari mountainous region and sent trainers to ISCAP and ISMP.
A successful offensive and eradication of IS-Somalia in Puntland could effectively deal a huge blow to the organization’s global financial structure and hinder future plans for attacks targeting the West or Russia.
What has happened so far?
In late December 2024, Puntland Defense Forces announced the imminent start of an offensive against the Islamic State’s stronghold in the Bari mountains in northeastern Somalia, in an attempt to uproot the organization.
However, IS decided to strike first. On the early morning of the 31st December 2024, 12 IS fighters stormed a PDF base in Dharjale, killing more than 20 soldiers and injuring dozens more, in addition to destroying more than 10 vehicles. The attack was carried out exclusively by foreign fighters, displaying once again IS-Somalia’s unique manpower makeup.
This was IS-Somalia’s most complex operation yet in the country, in which two SVBIEDs were used—a first in the region—which indicates the expertise in bomb-making among IS-Somalia’s fighters.
In the following days after the 31st December attack, PDF units started sweeping through the Bari mountains in search of IS hideouts. For the next two weeks, the PDF were harassed by drones and IEDs as they continued to find vacated IS positions, signifying a retreat of the militants to more defensible positions inside the complex tunnel and cave systems deep in the mountains.
A notable drone that was found by the PDF was an EVO Max 4N, valued at 12,500 USD. The drone was likely used to guide other cheaper drones utilized to drop projectiles on and/or crash into PDF units.
On the 8th of January, an IED blew up a convoy of the PDF near the village of Daraar in the Bari mountains, which led to the destruction of a vehicle and the killing of a soldier and the injury of 11 others.
On the 10th of January, IS fighters targeted several vehicles of the PDF near the town of Hopto, in the Qandala area of the Bari mountains with RPGs, which led to the destruction of a vehicle and the damage of 2 others, along with some injuries among PDF soldiers.
On the 12th January, an IED blew up a vehicle of the PDF near the village of Timirshe in the Bari mountains, which destroyed the vehicle and killed and injured the ones inside.
On the 13th January, IS fighters ambushed a unit of the PDF near the Abaarac mountains, claiming the killing of 5 soldiers and the injury of others after a battle with them and the detonation of 3 IEDs.
The same day, and in the same area, IS fighters attacked a “headquarters” of the PDF, which led to the killing of a soldier and the destroying of 2 vehicles. Additionally, another vehicle was targeted with RPGs, blowing it up and killing and wounding several soldiers inside.
Additionally, on the same day, IS fighters booby-trapped a cave near the town of Bili Taddan in the Abaarac mountains and blew it up as PDF soldiers entered it, which killed and injured at least 5 soldiers.
2 IS fighters stayed back to detonate the IEDs in the cave and engage PDF soldiers, which they did and returned to their positions with a rifle taken from a dead PDF soldier.
Again near the Abaarac mountains, on the 14th of January, another vehicle of the PDF was targeted by RPG, which led to the wounding of several soldiers and the disabling of the vehicle.
A major battle took place near the Dhabancad stream the morning of the same day, in which the PDF was ambushed by IS units, targeting them with mortars (likely guided by recon drones), and by kamikaze/projectile-dropping drones.
The toll on the IS side was reported by the military to be at least 20 fighters killed, although a single body was displayed. Puntland military also claimed they killed a female fighter during the battle.
On the 15th of January, IS fighters targeted a truck belonging to the PDF with RPGs in the Abaarac mountains in the Qandala area, carrying ammunition to the troops, which led to the destruction of the truck. Another vehicle was targeted the same way, which led to the injury of 3 soldiers.
On the 16th of January, PDF units continued to capture and destroy enemy terrorist camps, including a training and IED-producing facility. PDF troops also discovered abandoned IDs and the passport of a Saudi citizen, who was likely one of the 12 assailants on the 31st December in Dharjale, which would be interesting because he only seems to have arrived in Puntland one month earlier and first landed through Ethiopia.
By the 16th, pro-PDF journalist Jibril Qoobey claims the military has killed over 53 IS fighters, detonated 14 IEDs, downed 38 drones, and captured and destroyed 48 IS positions in an area of 130km2.
IS, on the 16th January, released a statement in its weekly Naba newspaper denying the claim and stating that they only lost a single fighter, which corroborates with the one pictured dead terrorist PDF posted on social media.
During the first 2 weeks of the offensive in the mountains, IS official channels did not speak of the drones they were using during the fighting. However, it can be noted that all the pictures released of the burning vehicles and injured PDF soldiers by IS were filmed by drones.
What is to be anticipated?
The PDF will likely face increasing challenges as they push further into the mountainous terrain, where IS-Somalia’s entrenched positions and well-prepared defenses, such as booby traps and hidden caves, pose significant threats. IS-Somalia's adept use of drones and IEDs, coupled with their extensive knowledge of the rugged terrain, will continue to inflict heavy losses on advancing forces.
Moreover, the presence of highly trained foreign fighters and sophisticated bomb-making expertise among IS ranks highlights the ongoing difficulty of neutralizing such a resourceful and resilient adversary. The PDF may need to adapt their tactics, possibly incorporating more technological countermeasures and intelligence-driven operations, to outmaneuver the militants effectively.
The outcome of this offensive could have broader implications for counterterrorism efforts in the region and globally. A decisive victory against IS-Somalia could cripple the group’s financial networks and influence, while a protracted conflict may embolden IS affiliates elsewhere. As the situation unfolds, international observers will likely focus on the sustainability of Puntland’s military campaign and the potential involvement of foreign powers in tipping the scales.
By Sahelian Analyst at